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Many older workers develop disabling health conditions or suffer 
disabling injuries. The labor-market consequences of disability can 
include job loss, reduced income, earlier retirement, and greater reli 
ance on private and social insurance systems to provide income secu 
rity. One important source of disability is work-related illness and 
injury. In this chapter, we examine the labor-market consequences of 
work-related disabling injuries and their relation to the age of the 
injured in three states: California, Wisconsin, and Washington. We 
also report estimates of the adequacy of income benefits received for 
these injuries from workers' compensation.
Earnings losses and related labor-market consequences result from 
workplace injuries in a number of ways. Most workers who suffer 
workplace injuries have temporary disabilities: complete recovery 
from the injury is expected, though some time out of work to recover is 
often needed, resulting in lost earnings. During that time out of work, 
workers qualify for temporary disability benefits from workers' com 
pensation, which replaces some of the earnings loss. In some cases, a 
workplace injury results in a permanent impairment or loss of physical 
or mental health. This permanent impairment may result in permanent 
loss of earning capacity and therefore of actual earnings. The perma 
nent impairments incurred on the job do not typically result in the level
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of disability that qualifies for SSDI or SSI benefits. Still, income secu 
rity is often threatened, and the onset of retirement may be substan 
tially hastened by workplace injury and illness.
A considerable amount is spent compensating workers with perma 
nent disabilities from workplace injuries. In California, permanent 
partial disability (PPD) income benefits for workers' compensation 
paid in 1997 totaled $1.1 billion, which is more than the total amount 
paid for the higher number of temporary disabilities. As we will dis 
cuss below, this $1.1 billion is only a fraction of the lost earnings of 
these injured workers. The remaining burden is shouldered by the 
workers and their families, as well as by other private and social insur 
ance programs.
As the workforce ages, the issue of permanently disabling work 
place injuries potentially becomes more significant. While the proba 
bility of a workplace injury decreases with age, according to Mitchell 
(1988), the probability of disabling injuries (and death) increases with 
age. Recovery from injury often takes longer and is less complete for 
older workers (Chirikos and Nestel 1989).
This chapter examines the losses experienced by workers with per 
manent disabilities in three states and compares the adequacy of com 
pensation received from the states' workers' compensation systems. 
We present evidence that older workers suffer proportionately more 
injuries with permanently disabling consequences and that the losses 
suffered by older workers are greater, on average, than those of 
younger workers. We also find that injury-related non-employment is 
higher among older workers. Moreover, the older workers in states we 
have studied appear to recover a smaller proportion of their losses from 
workers' compensation than do other injured workers.
The data we present come from recent estimates of lost earnings of 
injured or ill workers in three states: Washington (Biddle 1998), Wis 
consin (Boden and Galizzi 1999) and California (Peterson et al. 1997; 
Reville 1999). We summarize these recent studies and report new 
information about lost earnings from workplace injuries. The esti 
mates we present use administrative data on workers' compensation 
claims linked to longitudinal earnings data to directly estimate the 
earnings losses of injured or ill workers. They follow in the tradition of 
earlier "wage loss studies" by Johnson, Cullinan, and Curington (1978)
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and Berkowitz and Burton (1987). Both of these studies linked claims 
data to Social Security earnings records.
We begin with a brief description of workers' compensation per 
manent disability benefits in California, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
We then present the methodology used to derive estimates of injury- 
related lost earnings. Next, we describe lost earnings in the three states 
and how these losses are related to the age of injured workers. Finally, 
we review estimates of adequacy of workers' compensation benefits 
and discuss implications for the income security of older workers.
COMPENSATION FOR PERMANENT 
PARTIAL DISABILITY
Workers' compensation is a state-based administrative system that 
provides benefits to workers injured on the job without regard to fault. 
The benefits are set by formulas that differ from state to state. In Cali 
fornia, Wisconsin, and Washington, as in many other states, both tem 
porary total disability (TTD) benefits and permanent partial disability 
(PPD) benefits are paid. TTD benefits are intended to provide income 
support during recovery. PPD benefits are intended to compensate 
workers for the losses associated with a permanently disabling work 
place injury.
Setting compensation levels for TTD benefits is relatively straight 
forward. The goal is income replacement during recovery. Typically, 
the benefit amount is set at a level lower than the preinjury wage (often 
two-thirds) to provide the worker with an incentive to maintain safety 
in the workplace and to return to work when recovery is complete. 1 If 
injured workers receive temporary disability benefits for all eligible 
workplace injuries and if these benefits are paid for the full duration of 
injury-related lost work time, evaluating the adequacy of temporary 
disability income replacement is straightforward, since it is set by for 
mula. The actual time out of work is usually relatively short days 
instead of weeks.
Setting the benefit level and schedule of payments for permanent 
disability benefits is considerably more difficult. Unlike TTD benefits, 
PPD benefits are intended to compensate for current and future lost
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earnings capacity. The administrative burden and adverse incentive 
effects of a system that pays injured workers as the losses are experi 
enced (referred to as a wage loss system) are regarded in most states as 
prohibitive. For this reason, most states (including the three states 
compared in this study) set the benefit level for permanent disabilities 
prospectively. Formulas are often complex, and the basis of PPD bene 
fits varies from state to state. No states have set the benefit levels or the 
schedule of payments for PPD benefits with empirical knowledge of 
the economic consequences of disabling workplace injuries. For this 
reason, the extent to which PPD benefits achieve the goal of income 
replacement is unknown.
We compare estimates of the adequacy of income benefits in three 
states (California, Wisconsin, and Washington). The approaches 
adopted in these three states to compensating workers with perma 
nently disabling injuries are described below. For a discussion of the 
method of calculating permanent disabilities benefits in every state, see 
Earth and Niss (1999).
To estimate the impact of disability from occupational injuries, we 
estimate the losses experienced by injured workers over the years after 
the injury in each of the three states.2 The estimation of losses requires 
comparing postinjury earnings to a counterfactual: earnings for the 
same individual while uninjured. Let y] represent the earnings while 
injured, where I denotes "injured" and the subscript t denotes time 
from the injury. Let the counterfactual earnings be represented by yfu , 
where U denotes "uninjured." For any individual, the undiscounted 
earnings loss between the time of injury, which we will denote t = 0, 
and some future date, 7, is
Eq. 1 earnings loss = £ (y^ — y] )
t=0
In the next section, we will describe the estimation of earnings 
losses, which is complicated by the need to estimate the counterfac 
tual vu .
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To compare the adequacy of benefits across states, we also esti 
mate the fraction of earnings loss that is replaced by benefits for the 
average PPD case, i.e., the replacement rate:
. benefits 
Eq. 2 replacement rate =
earnings loss
THE ESTIMATION OF LOSSES
We report the estimates of earnings losses for PPD cases from 
Reville (1999), Boden and Galizzi (1999), and Biddle (1998). The 
results have been updated in some cases (for instance with a longer 
period of postinjury earnings for California than in Reville [1999]), and 
the analyses have been modified to make estimates as comparable as 
possible. However, due to data limitations in each state, the compari 
son groups available and therefore the approaches adopted to estimat 
ing losses in those papers and among states in this paper are different. 
In particular, in each state, a different control group is used. In this 
section, we describe the statistical problem raised by the estimation of 
losses and the solution adopted in each of the three states. In future 
work, we plan to obtain more comprehensive databases in each of these 
states (and in several others) in order to compare losses among states 
using identical methods.
The statistical problem in the estimation of earnings losses arises 
from the unobservability of the counterfactual ;y u in Eq. 1. If we 
could observe both injured and uninjured earnings for every injured 
worker, estimating earnings loss would be straightforward and given 
by Eq. 1. However, y, cannot be observed, and an estimate, yfu imist 
be constructed.
At an administrative level, workers' compensation programs must 
also estimate yu when setting benefits, and typically they use the pre- 
injury earnings. However, particularly for estimating the long-term 
consequences of permanent disabilities, the preinjury wage is not a sat 
isfactory proxy. First, without the injury, the worker may have experi 
enced wage growth over time, which the preinjury earnings will not 
measure. Second, if the injury had not occurred, it is possible that the
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injured worker would have been unemployed or exited the workforce 
for different reasons. It is not appropriate to assume that they would 
have earned the preinjury earnings in every postinjury earnings period.
Instead of using preinjury earnings, we estimate uninjured earnings 
in the postinjury period using the earnings of a comparison (control) 
group. This approach draws its inspiration from the training program 
evaluation literature (Dehejia and Wahba 1996; Heckman and Hotz 
1989; Holland 1986; LaLonde 1986). The control group comprises 
workers who were similar to the injured workers with respect to demo 
graphic and economic characteristics but who did not experience a 
workplace injury during the time period under examination.3
Biddle (1998) and Boden and Galizzi (1999) as well as the esti 
mates from Washington and Wisconsin reported below, each used 
workers with minor injuries as comparison groups. To correct for 
observed differences between injured workers and controls, a fixed- 
effect earnings regression model is estimated. Reville (1999) and our 
estimates for California (reported below) used uninjured workers at the 
same firm as controls. Observed differences are corrected for using a 
case-control matching methodology. In the remainder of this section, 
we describe the particular estimation approach and the data used for 
each state.
Washington and Wisconsin
In Biddle (1998) and Boden and Galizzi (1999), as well as in the 
Washington and Wisconsin estimates reported below, yu is estimated 
from the earnings of workers with minor workplace injuries. The 
minor injuries used in the Washington study resulted in less than three 
days out of work and no permanent disability benefits (referred to as 
medical-only cases). The Wisconsin minor injuries resulted in 8 to 10 
days out of work and no permanent disability benefits. In both states, 
earnings regressions were estimated using longitudinal data on real 
quarterly earnings for a pooled sample of controls and injured workers. 
Independent variables included age in the quarter of observation and 
calendar year and quarter dummies to control for business cycle effects 
common to the earnings of all workers. Also, pre- and postinjury earn 
ings were allowed to follow different trends depending on the severity 
of the injury. 5
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The regression coefficients were used to project what the earnings 
of the injured worker would have been in the quarter of injury and the 
postinjury quarters, using that worker's estimated fixed effect and the 
coefficients estimated for the comparison group. The earnings loss 
estimate for each postinjury quarter was set equal to this earnings pro 
jection minus the actual earnings of the injured worker. Quarterly 
earnings loss estimates for the quarter of injury and 14 subsequent 
quarters were then discounted at a 2.3 percent rate5 and summed to pro 
duce a single loss figure.
To check the quality of the control group, the preinjury earnings of 
the controls and the injured workers were compared in both Washing 
ton and Wisconsin. In Wisconsin, preinjury differences in quarterly 
earnings growth6 between the controls and injured workers were small 
(under $8) and statistically insignificant (Boden and Galizzi 1999); in 
Washington, the difference was about $17 per quarter.
In Washington, the claims data are from the Washington Depart 
ment of Labor and Industries and consist of a sample of workers' com 
pensation injuries from July 1993 to June 1994. The sample includes 
8769 medical-only cases and 34,618 workers receiving income benefits 
(TTD and PPD). The claims data are linked to 21 quarterly reports on 
earnings provided by employers in the state to the Washington 
Employment Security Department. 7 The earnings are from six quarters 
before to 14 quarters after the injury. The Wisconsin claims data pro 
vided by the Wisconsin Division of Workers' Compensation are from 
1989 and 1990. They are linked to 24 quarterly earnings reports from 
the Wisconsin Division of Employment Security, ranging from 8 quar 
ters before to as long as 18 quarters after the injury. The sample con 
sists of 6,416 short-term injuries and 47,889 longer-term injuries and 
injuries involving PPD benefits.
California
Reville (1999)8 and the estimates reported below for California 
used uninjured workers as controls. Each injured worker was matched 
to up to 10 uninjured workers at the same employer with earnings 
approximately equal to the preinjury earnings for the injured worker. 
The mean difference in earnings between the injured and control work 
ers in the quarters after injury was then used to estimate losses.9 An
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estimate of cumulative earnings loss is calculated by summing over 
time for every worker the earnings loss in every quarter, discounted (at 
2.3 percent) to the quarter of injury.
As in Washington and Wisconsin, to test for the quality of the con 
trols, Reville (1999) compared the preinjury earnings of the injured 
workers to the comparison workers over the years prior to injury. Con 
trols were matched to injured workers based on the four quarters prior 
to the injury. Eight additional quarters before the first four quarters 
prior are available for testing the controls. The match was found to be 
very close, with an average quarterly difference in earnings of only 
$28, less than 2 percent of the difference found in the quarters follow 
ing injury. 10
The claims data are from the California Workers' Compensation 
Insurance Rating Bureau and consist of workers' compensation PPD 
claims from injuries during 1993 at insured firms. 11 The data are 
matched to quarterly earnings data from the fourth quarter of 1989 
through the second quarter of 1998 from the California Employment 
Development Department. Data on 8,107 claims are matched to earn 
ings data for 28,862 uninjured workers.
PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY BENEFITS 
IN THREE STATES
The amount paid for temporary disability benefits differs among 
states. There are, however, only a few dimensions along which tempo 
rary disability benefits vary. Benefits are set as a fraction of the prein 
jury wage, where the fraction varies among states. There are also 
different maximum and minimum benefits, waiting periods, and maxi 
mum numbers of weeks. Most states use the pretax wage as a basis for 
temporary disability benefits. However, because workers' compensa 
tion benefits are not taxed, other states base their benefits on "spend 
able earnings," which are meant to approximate after-tax earnings. The 
rules governing temporary disability payments in the three states we 
examine are summarized in Table 1.
Differences among states in permanent disability benefits are 
harder to categorize along a few dimensions. This reflects the com-
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Table 1 Summary of Income Benefits in California, Wisconsin, and 
Washington
California 1993 income benefits
TTD weekly amount
TTD waiting period 
PPD weekly amount 
PPD weekly benefit maximum




2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum of 
$336
3 days
2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum
Maximum: $140 (ratings under 25)
$148 (earnings 25 and above)
Vary by rating:
25th percentile: 24 weeks 
50th percentile: 50 weeks 
75th percentile: 96 weeks
99th percentile: 426 weeks plus life 
pension
2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum of $246
Wisconsin 1989-90 income benefits
TTD payment amounts
TTD waiting period 
PTD weekly amount
Weeks of PPD benefits 
Lump-sum payments of unaccrued 




2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum of $363 
(1989) or $388 (1990)
3 days (7-day retroactive penod)
2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum of $125 
(1989) or $131 (1990)
10 weeks per percentage point 
25th percentile: 13 weeks 
50th percentile: 28 weeks 
75th percentile: 60 weeks 
99th percentile: 526 weeks
2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum of $363 
(1989) or $388 (1990)
(continued)
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Table 1 (continued)
Washington 1993-94 income 
benefits
TTD payment amounts





From 60% to 75% of preinjury pretax wage, 
depending on marital status and number of 
dependents; maximum of $2216 per month 
paid in bimonthly installments
3 days
Total awards based on schedule of injuries and/ 
or percentage disability rating system. If 
total award exceeds $6600 dollars, monthly 
payments are made according to TTD 
payment schedule until full award is paid.
Ordinary TTD benefits can be received during 
participation in approved VR program.
plexity of the problem of setting higher benefits for people with greater 
disability based on comparing individuals with different injuries. 12 In 
most states, there are "schedules" that set dollar amounts for particular 
injuries (such as $27,813 for the loss of a thumb in Washington in 
1997), though the schedules differ among states and the ranking of 
injuries is sometimes reversed in different states. Most states also use 
some kind of rating system that ranks different injuries on a scale of 1 
to 100 depending upon physician impairment ratings or ratings derived 
from medical descriptions of impairments (such as the fraction of range 
of motion that is lost in the shoulder). 13 These rating systems are used 
either for all injuries, as in California, or only for unscheduled injuries. 
Like the schedules, these rating systems rank different injuries, and the 
relative ranking of particular injuries in different rating systems can 
vary. Some states pay different amounts depending upon whether you 
have returned to work or returned to the at-injury employer. In addi 
tion, there are differences in weekly amounts and in the number of 
weeks that benefits are paid.
In the remainder of this section, we describe more fully the rules 
determining the size of permanent benefits payments in each of the
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three states being examined and present some descriptive statistics on 
the fraction of claims with permanent disabilities.
Washington
In Washington, there are statutorily determined PPD award 
amounts for a list of specified injuries to scheduled body parts (for 
example, amputation of the leg above the knee). Workers can also be 
given benefits for unspecified injuries to scheduled body parts. In this 
case, a rating for the percentage of impairment is multiplied by the 
scheduled amputation value of the body part. Finally, there are awards 
for unspecified injuries to unscheduled body parts (including, notably, 
backs and necks). In these cases, physicians make use of a set of rules 
and guidelines issued by the Department of Labor and Industry to 
assign a "percentage of total bodily impairment" caused by the injury. 
This percentage is then multiplied by a scheduled total bodily impair 
ment value, which was $118,800 as of July 1994. As Table 1 indicates, 
during the 1993-1994 period, awards below $6,600 (a little over half of 
all awards) were paid out in a lump sum, while awards greater than that 
amount were paid out in monthly installments.
Table 2 reports the percentage of injured workers receiving perma 
nent disability awards in various age categories in Washington, Wis 
consin, and California. The figures in the cells reflect the ratio of


















"Wisconsin Division of Workers' Compensation, authors' calculations 
b Washington Department of Labor and Industries, authors' calculations. 
c Random sample of self-insured indemnity claims data collected by RAND. 
d Workers' Compensation Insurance Ratings Bureau data, authors' calculations.
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claims receiving PPD awards to all claims with income benefits, that is, 
all claims involving compensation for lost time and/or PPD benefits. 
In Washington, 23.4 percent of claims with income benefits in the 
period examined involved PPD awards. However, this percentage rises 
with age and is 39 percent for injured workers 55 years or older.
Wisconsin
Wisconsin has two kinds of PPD benefits, functional impairment 
benefits and earnings capacity benefits. Functional impairment bene 
fits are based upon a physician impairment rating. Earning capacity 
benefits are paid only to workers with nonscheduled injuries (typically 
head, back, or neck injuries) who do not return to work or who are 
rehired at no more than 85 percent of their former wage. Typically, 
workers qualifying for earning capacity benefits have not returned to 
their former employer. Earning capacity benefits use the same formula 
per percentage point of permanent disability, but the disability percent 
ages tend to be much larger than for functional impairment benefits. 
They are determined by reports of "vocational experts" on the effect of 
the impairment on the worker's wage-earning capacity.
Table 1 displays PPD benefit levels in Wisconsin for 1989-1990 
injuries. PPD benefits are subject to a maximum weekly benefit of 
$125 for injuries occurring in 1989 and $131 for those occurring in 
1990. This maximum weekly benefit represents just over one-third of 
the maximum weekly TTD benefit. Each percent of permanent disabil 
ity of the body as a whole is allocated 10 weeks' benefits. For 1989 
injuries, this implies a maximum benefit payment of $1,250 per per 
centage point of disability. Generally, benefits are paid monthly, so 
that monthly maximum PPD benefits for 1989-1990 injuries were 
about $500. Only 18.1 percent of workers with lost-time workers' 
compensation cases received PPD benefits in Wisconsin in 1989-1990 
(Table 2).
California
California's method for setting permanent disability benefits is dis 
tinctive and perhaps the most complex of the three states. All disabili-
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ties are described and ranked in a rating system that is unique to 
California. This rating system includes medical descriptions of impair 
ments as well as work restrictions (such as different ratings for "no 
heavy lifting" and "no very heavy lifting"). It also includes compensa 
tion for "subjectives" such as chronic pain, even in the absence of med 
ical evidence to support it.
As a result of this relatively permissive description of permanent 
disability, California has a considerably larger fraction of claims with 
permanent disability. As seen in Table 2, more than 40 percent of indi 
viduals receiving income benefit payments also receive permanent dis 
ability benefits. As in Wisconsin and Washington, the fraction with 
permanent disabilities increases with age, so that for workers over 55, 
almost half receive permanent disability benefits. 14
California is also unique in the extent to which benefits are 
adjusted to account for the individual circumstances of the injured 
worker. On the assumption that the same injury will lead to different 
losses depending upon the occupation of the injured worker, Califor 
nia's disability rating system assigns different values for the same 
injury in different occupations. For instance, an injury that affects 
speech will lead to higher benefits for a radio announcer than for a 
bricklayer; however, an injury that affects the shoulder will lead to a 
higher benefit for the bricklayer. Finally, on the assumption that recov 
ery is harder with age, higher benefits are paid for older workers.
Table 1 shows that the maximum benefit levels for temporary and 
permanent disabilities in California are similar to those in Wisconsin 
(and difficult to compare with Washington's). The formula for weeks 
is very complex, with the number of weeks for each additional disabil 
ity rating point increasing with the disability rating. Using the actual 
distribution of PPD awards, the table shows the number of weeks of 
PPD benefits by quartile of award for Wisconsin and California. In 
general, California has longer periods of PPD than Wisconsin.
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EARNINGS LOSS AND REPLACEMENT RATE 
ESTIMATES BY STATE
In Table 3, we report the losses for all three states, together with 
the total income benefits paid, the preinjury average quarterly earnings, 
and the pretax replacement rate. Total income benefits paid includes 
temporary total disability and permanent partial disability benefits in 
all three states. In addition, in California and Wisconsin, injured work 
ers are allowed to accept a cash settlement for the future value of the 
medical care in exchange for releasing the insurer or employer for any 
liability for future medica expensesl. This is not allowed in Washing 
ton. Finally, all three states pay a vocational rehabilitation (VR) main 
tenance allowance, which is paid while the worker is unable to work 
due to participation in VR. 15 Losses are reported in each state for 3.5 
years and 10 years after injury. In all three states, the estimates at 3.5 
years are based on observed postinjury earnings. Estimates at 10 years 
are based on projecting the losses an additional 6.5 years, discounted 
and based on the loss estimated for the final year observed.
Table 3 shows that losses in Washington and Wisconsin are very 
similar; losses in California appear to be considerably higher. Califor 
nia income benefits paid are also considerably higher than those in 
Washington and Wisconsin, but not high enough to cover the differ 
ences in losses. 16 This is shown in the far right column of Table 3, 
which reports the pretax replacement rate at 10 years among states. In 
Washington and Wisconsin, the replacement rate is over 45 percent, 
while in California, the replacement rate is below 40 percent. 17


































a Dollar values in 1984 dollars. 
b Projected.
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Although useful for comparing among states, the after-tax replace 
ment rate might be preferred as a measure of adequacy because work 
ers' compensation benefits are tax-free. In after-tax dollars, the 
earnings loss would be 20-30 percent lower, and therefore the replace 
ment rate would be higher. However, two other sources of bias are in 
the opposite direction. First, the choice of 10 years for the replacement 
rate is arbitrary. In work in progress by the authors using California 
data, losses are found to continue at much the same annual level even 
with seven years of observed postinjury earnings. Since virtually all 
injured workers have already received all workers' compensation bene 
fits by five years, but losses may continue for many years after that, the 
replacement rate for longer periods would be lower. Also, fringe bene 
fits are a significant source of compensation. 18 Some fringe benefits are 
tied to earnings, and others may be lost if the disabled worker cannot 
return to the preinjury job. 19
Table 4 shows losses over the observed period of 3.5 years and 
losses projected to both 6.5 years and 10 years for three age groups. 
Estimates are reported only for Washington and Wisconsin, because 
data limitations prevent the calculation of these estimates for Califor 
nia. The table shows that, in both states, losses increase with age. In





Losses (projected 6.5 yr.)





Losses (projected 6.5 yr.)
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Wisconsin, injured workers under 35 experience losses of $13,832 over 
the 3.5 years following injury, while workers over 55 experience losses 
almost twice as large. In Washington, the increase in lost earnings with 
age is less dramatic, with workers under 35 losing $14,782 over the 3.5 
years following injury, and injured workers 55 and over losing an esti 
mated $17,691.
Because earnings increase with age, and higher-paid workers will 
lose more for the same amount of lost work time, when comparing 
among age groups it is useful to normalize the lost earnings by prein- 
jury earnings. Dividing the loss by the preinjury quarterly earnings 
provides a measure of lost earnings in terms of quarters of lost earnings 
at the preinjury earnings level. Using this measure, the age pattern of 
losses for injured workers in Wisconsin is different than in Washington. 
In Wisconsin, workers over 55 lose the equivalent of almost one year of 
preinjury earnings during the 3.5 years after injury, compared with less 
than nine months (three quarters) for each of the other two age groups. 
This suggests that older disabled workers in Wisconsin experience 
more time out of work following the injury than younger disabled 
workers. In contrast, the youngest disabled workers in Washington 
experience the largest earnings losses relative to the preinjury earnings. 
Injured workers in Washington under 35 experience over nine months 
(three quarters) of lost preinjury earnings; by comparison, workers 
over 55 experience less than seven months of losses.
Projecting losses to 10 years after injury produces results for Wis 
consin that are qualitatively similar to the losses for 3.5 years: older 
disabled workers experience considerably larger losses measured abso 
lutely or in months of lost earnings. At 10 years postinjury, months of 
lost earnings in Washington become similar among age groups. In 
both states, replacement of lost earnings during the first 10 years after 
the injury is considerably lower for workers over 55. In Figure 1, the 
replacement rate of 10-year losses by age group is shown for Washing 
ton and Wisconsin. For the two age groups below 55, the replacement 
rate is approximately one-half. For the injured workers aged 55 and 
over, the replacement rate in both states is 28 percent.20
Our 10-year projections may provide an overstatement of losses 
for workers over 55, since by age 65, it is likely they will have retired 
even if they had not been injured and therefore would have received no 
further earnings losses.21 For this reason, we also report 6.5-year pro-
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Figure 1 Projected 10-Year Earnings Replacement Rate by Age: 
Washington and Wisconsin PPD Cases
Under 35 35-54 Over 55
Wisconsin D Washington
jections for losses (3.5 observed years and 3 projected years at the last 
quarter's average loss), which presumably are less likely to be biased in 
this manner. The 6.5 year projected replacement rate of 0.41 for Wash 
ington and 0.35 for Wisconsin is lower than even the 10-year projected 
replacement rate for the younger age groups.
The results in Figure 1 and Table 4 suggest that the adequacy of 
replacement rates is lowest for the oldest injured workers. It should be 
noted, though, that the 10-year replacement rate provides a limited 
window during which to observe losses. It is possible that losses 
beyond the observed period for workers in the oldest age category 
(over 55) will be considerably lower or nonexistent because many 
would have retired even had they not been injured. Younger workers 
may lose less during the first few years but over their lifetime may lose 
more.22
Table 5 reports on how well PPD benefits are tailored to lost earn 
ings. As noted earlier, disability ratings are used in all three states to 
predict which workers have greater disability so that higher benefits
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can be targeted to the most serious cases. If this system were success 
ful, we would expect benefits would increase at least in proportion to 
losses. To examine this, the table divides the distribution of income 
benefits into quintiles and calculates the average losses within each 
quintile. We would expect that the losses would increase with the 
income benefit quintile. In California, the lowest benefit quintile had 
losses that are five-sixths the losses of the second lowest quintile; how 
ever, benefits in the first quintile are 30 percent of those of the second 
quintile. An already low replacement rate of 19 percent for the second 
quintile is far lower than that for the first (7 percent). The results for 
Washington are even more dramatic. While the highest quintile 
receives benefits five times larger than those of the lowest quintile, 
losses are only 25 percent higher. Losses in the second and fourth 
quintiles are lower than in the first and third, respectively. In contrast, 
losses in Wisconsin increase monotonically with income benefits, lead 
ing to very similar replacement rates in all but the highest quintile.24
The relative success in equitably distributing benefits in Wisconsin 
may be driven by Wisconsin's two-tier system, which pays earnings 
capacity benefits only to workers who either do not return to work or 
who return at a substantially lower wage. Workers receiving earnings 
capacity benefits will almost always have higher losses. Washington's 
relative inability to target benefits to the more serious cases may be 
driven by the limitations of the impairment-based system used to set 
benefits. It is possible that information on the type of injury alone does 
not capture as much variation in the postinjury outcomes as economic 
factors such as the ability to return to work (the payment of earnings 
capacity benefits in Wisconsin) or the personal characteristics of the 
injured (the occupational and age adjustments to disability ratings used 
in California).
Several recent papers have noted that, particularly in permanent 
disability cases, absence from work following the initial return to work 
is common among workers with occupational injuries (Biddle 1998; 
Butler, Johnson, and Baldwin 1995; Galizzi and Boden 1996; Reville 
1999). For this reason, we depart from the approach often adopted in 
the workers' compensation literature of examining duration to first 
return to work, and instead we examine differences over the years after 
the injury between the fraction of injured workers and controls without 
reported earnings. This allows both the injured workers and the con-
Table 5 The Relationship of Losses and Total Income Benefits, by PPD Benefit Percentile
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1 Temporary plus permanent disability benefits.
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trols to move in and out of the labor force, but if the fraction of injured 
workers out of the labor force exceeds the fraction of controls, then we 
assume this is injury-related.24 This estimate of injury-related non- 
employment is reported in Table 6 for 3, 5, 10, and (where available) 
20 quarters after injury.
Table 6 shows that in all three states, injury-related non-employ 
ment continues to be significant even 10 quarters following injury. It is 
clear that California's considerably higher earnings losses are associ 
ated with much higher rates of injury-related non-employment. Both 
the 1992 and 1993 injured workers have injury-related non-employ 
ment exceeding 15 percent for the first 21/2 years, though similar rates 
are never observed in Washington or Wisconsin, not even during the 
first quarter after injury. As shown in Reville and Schoeni (1999), 
injury-related non-employment is higher in recessions, and the differ 
ence between the states may be in part driven by the severity of the 
recession experienced in California in the early 1990s. There may be 
other reasons for the difference, including differences in litigation rates 
among the states and differences in the characteristics of jobs, workers, 
and industries. We plan to explore these differences in future studies.
Table 7 shows non-employment for Washington and Wisconsin by 
age group. In both Washington and Wisconsin, compared with nondis- 
abled workers, workers over 55 with permanently disabling injuries are 
increasingly likely to be out of work as time from the injury increases. 
This suggests that a disabling workplace injury (as with the onset of 
other health conditions) may lead older workers to choose to retire ear 
lier than they would have otherwise.

























a ND = no data available
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Table 7 Injury-Related Non-Employment Rates by Quarters from Injury 
and by Age Group, PPD Cases in Wisconsin and Washington (%)
Quarters 




























This paper examines the losses experienced by workers with per 
manent disabilities in California, Washington and Wisconsin and com 
pares the adequacy of compensation received from those states' 
workers' compensation systems. We find evidence of substantial 
losses from permanently disabling injuries in the three states. The state 
programs differ substantially in the proportion of workers' compensa 
tion cases receiving permanent disability benefits and in the average 
losses sustained by these injured workers, reflecting both differences in 
the laws and practices in those states. In general, California stands out: 
a higher proportion of injured workers received permanent disability 
benefits in California, experiencing higher average losses and receiving 
higher average benefits (but replacing a lower fraction of lost earnings). 
Wisconsin's system appears to lead to better targeting of benefits to 
losses, while Washington's impairment-based PPD schedule leads to 
losses unrelated to benefits paid.
It is possible that some of the differences among the states are 
driven by differences in industry mix, demographics, and economic 
conditions. At this point, we also cannot rule out the possibility that 
the differences are driven, at least in part, by differences in methods
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used. However, our preliminary research (which is still in progress) on 
disabling injuries in Florida, a state with industry mix and demograph 
ics that are similar to those of California, has found losses that are at 
least as close to those in California as to Wisconsin's or Washington's. 
This research has used the same methods we have used in Wisconsin, 
which suggests that the methods do not drive the observed differences. 
In our ongoing research, we are estimating losses with similar control 
groups and will examine how measured interstate differences (such as 
industry mix) affect the disparities in the losses we have measured.
Besides differences in earnings losses, California also pays PPD 
benefits to more than twice the proportion of workers with lost-time 
injuries than do the other two states (see Table 2). This does not neces 
sarily imply that more workers in California suffer long-term losses; as 
noted earlier, California has a relatively more permissive definition of 
permanent disability than the other states, with greater reliance on sub 
jective complaints (such as pain) and on work restrictions. However, 
Biddle (1998) and Boden and Galizzi (1999) both found that individu 
als with long-term temporary disability benefits (more than four 
weeks) but lacking permanent disability benefits have losses that are, 
on average, almost as large as those in PPD cases and that these losses 
continued at least to the end of the period they observed. 25 The long- 
term TTD group is larger in these states than the group receiving per 
manent disability benefits. Since they do not receive PPD benefits but 
have similar losses, these workers also had the lowest replacement 
rates. Within this group, there are certain to be a significant number of 
people who would have qualified for PPD benefits had they been 
injured in California. Accounting for this might reduce the differences 
in replacement rates among states, even if it does not reduce the differ 
ences in earnings losses.
Our data indicate that workplace injuries and illnesses are impor 
tant sources of disability throughout the working life, but that they are 
particularly so for older workers. When older workers are injured, they 
appear to suffer more permanently disabling injuries, and those with 
permanent disabilities experience more injury-related non-employ 
ment. Current evidence on the relationship of age and losses is ambig 
uous. Still, older workers in the states we have studied appear to 
recover a smaller proportion of their losses from workers' compensa 
tion than do other injured workers, at least over the first few years after
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injury. This raises concerns about the extent to which the uncompen- 
sated burden of work-related disabilities of older workers falls on the 
workers and their families or is absorbed by other public and private 
insurance systems.
The mechanisms behind the age-related differences in employment 
and losses are unclear. We do not know the extent to which they are 
simply caused by age-related physiological effects like delayed and 
incomplete recovery, nor do we yet understand the interaction between 
retirement decisions and the onset of work-related disabilities. Health 
and disability has been shown to be a primary reason for retirement 
(Anderson and Burkhauser 1985; Blau, Gilleskie, and Slusher 1997; 
Bound 1991; Sherman 1985; Stern 1988), but the extent to which 
health and disability is driven by occupational factors is unknown. 
Finally, we have questions about how the nature of employer accom 
modations may differentially affect older and younger workers. Stud 
ies have shown that when the employers provide accommodations for 
disabled workers and rehire injured workers, time lost from work is 
reduced substantially and the employment trajectory is improved 
(Burkhauser, Butler, and Kirn 1995; Galizzi and Boden 1996).
The analysis of disability from workplace injuries is likely to prove 
useful not only in its own right, but also in helping us to understand 
more about the labor-market impacts of nonworkplace health shocks 
on older workers. In particular, occupational injuries provide unusu 
ally good availability of administrative data and potential access to 
more detailed data about the behavior of both the supply and demand 
sides of the labor market for disabled workers.
Notes
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Institute for Occupa 
tional Safety and Health, and the State of California Commission on Health and Safety 
and Workers' Compensation.
1. A considerable literature in economics exists on the incentive effects of temporary 
disability benefits. See, for instance, Moore and Viscusi (1990), Krueger (1990), 
and Meyer, Viscusi, and Durbin (1995)
2. For a discussion of some theoretical issues in the interpretation of earnings losses 
as a measure of welfare of injured workers, see Reville, Bhattacharya, and Sager 
(1999)
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3. Earnings losses have also been estimated using similar methods in the literature 
on the impact of downsizing. See, for instance, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 
(1993) and Schoeni and Dardia (1996).
4. Workers were categorized into severity groups based on number of days missed 
and whether PPD benefits were received, and workers in different groups were 
allowed to have separate premjury trends of earnings. The specification allowed 
the earnings of workers in the comparison group to follow a linear trend in the 
postmjury period as well, while for each of the injured worker groups, dummy 
variables for the quarter of injury and the five subsequent quarters allowed earn 
ings to follow a flexible, nonmonotonic path following the injury. After this six- 
quarter period, a separate linear earnings trend was specified for each injured 
worker group. Variables were also included to control for the impact of any sub 
sequent injuries on earnings. The Washington estimates were based on a fixed- 
effects specification, while the Wisconsin estimates used a first-differences 
approach. The results showed little sensitivity to the specification used.
5. Boden and Galizzi (1999) used a 3 percent rate, but the estimates presented below 
use a 2.3 percent rate.
6. The use of a fixed-effect regression technique controls for any persistent preinjury 
differences in the level of earnings between injured workers and the workers in 
the comparison group. Even before controlling, however, these differences 
amount to less than 5 percent of quarterly earnings.
7. In each of the three states, workers' compensation claims data are linked to longi 
tudinal quarterly earnings data collected by the state for administration of the 
unemployment insurance (UI) program. The earnings data are obtained for both 
the injured workers and the comparison workers. The UI data reports all within- 
state, before-tax earnings at Ul-covered employers (approximately 95 percent of 
employment in each of the states). If no earnings data are reported for a particular 
quarter for either injured workers or controls, we assume that zero earnings are 
received. Earnings data for the self-insured and for workers who move out of 
state will be missing. This will not bias estimates unless disabled workers are sys 
tematically more or less likely to receive these types of earnings.
8. See also Peterson, Reville, Stem, and Earth (1997).
9. For a general discussion of matching in econometrics, see Heckman, Ichimura, 
and Todd (1997).
10. This test is not directly comparable to the test in Washington and Wisconsin. The 
$28 difference in California is in levels, while the $17 and $8 differences for the 
other states reported above were in changes (or growth).
11. Two-thirds of employees in California work at insured firms (firms that purchase 
insurance). The remaining one-third are employed at self-insured firms.
12. States vary in the statutory justification for permanent disability benefits. Many 
states, such as California, justify it as compensation for loss of future earnings 
capacity. Construction of an ordinal scale to rank injuries and set compensation is 
equally complex with the justifications used in other states, such as compensation 
for "impairment."
Session 3: Chronic Illness and Disability 287
13. The most commonly used rating system is the American Medical Association's 
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (1993)
14. Table 2 reports the fraction with PPD by age using a new sample of self-insured 
claims recently collected by RAND. Data on age for workers with temporary dis 
ability benefits are not available for the insured firms examined in this paper.
15. In addition, workers' legal and medical-legal expenses have not been subtracted 
from the indemnity paid to the worker, even though they are usually directly paid 
to attorneys or evaluating doctors.
16. In Reville (1999), estimates of the replacement rate use simulated benefits paid 
out over time according to the schedule using the information from the WCIRB 
data on actual disability ratings and various benefits paid. This was intended to 
insure that the time window for losses and benefits coincide and to eliminate the 
impact of the settlement of medical costs in the replacement rate. This led to 
lower total income benefit payments (reflecting the fact that five years of losses 
were reported and therefore the benefits represented five years of benefits) and 
therefore lower replacement rates. This approach is not adopted here for consis 
tency with the data available from other states.
17. Berkowitz and Burton (1987), using data from claims in 1968, also found thai, 
replacement rates were considerably higher in Wisconsin than in California.
18. According to U.S. Department of Labor (1998), nonwage benefits account for 
approximately 38 percent of wage and salary income.
19. We interpret the replacement rates as the fraction of losses replaced by workers' 
compensation benefits Another interesting estimate would be the fraction of 
losses replaced by all government benefits. While most of the injured workers are 
not disabled enough to receive Social Secunty disability benefits, we suspect thai, 
they are more likely to receive them than their controls, and therefore replacemeni. 
rates counting all benefits would be higher. However, we do not have data on 
Social Security disability benefits for these workers.
20. This, too, may be somewhat exaggerated by the projection method for losses, 
which does not account for the decline in losses associated with retirement.
21. The regression specification includes a fourth-order polynomial in age, and there 
fore we expect that we have accounted for age during the observed period flexibly 
enough to correctly estimate losses even given the decline in labor force participa 
tion after age 65.
22. Benefits for PPD in state workers' compensation systems differentially reflect the 
two opposing effects of age on lost earnings. As noted earlier, in California., 
higher benefits are paid to older workers to compensate them for their diminished 
ability to recover from injury. In contrast, in Colorado, lower benefits are paid to 
older workers (Barth and Niss 1999), presumably because they are closer to 
retirement and will not experience lost earnings over as many years.
23. In all states, the replacement rate results for the highest quintile may be exagger 
ated relative to the lower quintiles by the use of a 10-year projection period. This 
group is likely to have large and long-term losses.
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24. As with earnings, in all three states we found no evidence of significant differ 
ences in labor force participation of injured workers and controls prior to injury.
25. Some people who have not received PPD benefits may nevertheless have perma 
nent impairments that cause long-term earnings losses. This may reflect a limita 
tion in the disability rating mechanism used by the state. Alternatively, long-term 
losses may occur because of labor-market effects that persist after recovery from 
injury. For example, workers who stay off work several months may lose their 
preinjury jobs and their investments in skill and senionty at those jobs. Earnings 
and employment after return could be affected, even if they fully recover from the 
effects of the injury. Finally, some of the long-term losses may be attributable to 
employers' unwillingness to hire people with the stigma of past workers' compen 
sation injuries and illnesses. Employers may believe that long spells of work 
absence mark someone as unreliable or otherwise unacceptable for employment, 
thus limiting employment opportunities and reducing future earnings for this 
group.
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